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Abstract— Resilience against disaster scenarios is essential to 
network operators, not only because of the potential economic 
impact of a disaster but also because communication networks 
form the basis of crisis management. COST RECODIS aims at 
studying measures, rules, techniques and prediction mechanisms 
for different disaster scenarios. This paper gives an overview of 
different solutions in the context of technology-related disasters. 
After a general overview, the paper focuses on resilient Software 
Defined Networks. 
Keywords—software defined networks, resilience, disaster survivability 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The increase in capacity of communication networks has 
boosted the importance of their reliability. Apart from random 
failures such a fiber cuts, disaster-based failures may also 
occur. These failures are due to natural disasters (e.g. floods or 
earthquakes), malicious attacks (like denial of service 
− DDoS) or technology-related disasters. In spite of 
significant efforts and investments for high-availability, 
infrastructure systems occasionally experience software/ 
hardware failures, operation errors, security attacks or natural 
disasters. Upon the occurrence of such undesired events, it is 
crucial to recover the system as quickly as possible. 
This paper aims at looking into technology-related 
disasters. This type of disasters encompasses different 
disruptions, such as power blackouts that affect several nodes, 
misconfigurations which causes wrong traffic routing, 
electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attacks (i.e., an intense energy 
field) that instantly overload or disrupt multiple electrical 
circuits in a large geographic area. 
Although this paper focuses mainly on resilience of 
Software Defined Networking (SDN), in the latter part of this 
section, we first present an overview of three main categories 
and aspects of technology-related disasters, including: power 
outages, social resilience, and correlated cascading failures.  
A. Power Outages 
Power blackouts do not only interrupt or limit everyday 
life but also complicate or even preclude communications, by 
affecting communication infrastructures. Unavailability of 
communication infrastructure affects not only regular 
communications but also public safety communications. 
Power blackouts can have impact on a large number of 
customers: India (2012) with 670 million of affected users, 
Brazil and Paraguay (2009) with 87 million of affected users, 
Europe (2006) with 10 million affected users [1].  
The causes of power blackouts can be classified as failure 
of production, failure of transmission or due to increased 
demands (e.g., due to a heat wave). It has been shown that 
power supply is a terrorism and military target by using 
bombs, cyber-attacks (e.g., the Stuxnet virus), HEMP (high 
altitude electromagnetic pulse), and IEMI (Intentional Electro 
Magnetic Interference) attacks [2].   
The impact and risk of communication networks by power 
blackouts has been analyzed by the German Federal 
Parliament [3] for three different scenarios: Scenario 1 
(outages of less than 8 hours), Scenario 2 (outages of 8-24 
hours) and Scenario 3 for outages of more than 1 day. It was 
shown that mobile networks and Internet access networks 
could survive Scenario 1 but not Scenarios 2 and 3. This 
conclusion is based on the batteries availability and duration.  
However, it has been shown that in case of power-based 
disasters, communications is possible by using short-radio 
technologies, by making creative use of the remains of the 
technological landscape by users [4] or by allowing private 
wireless routers to transition to an emergency mode creating    
a supportive wireless mesh network [5]. Furthermore, network 
operators consider also techniques to limit the impact of 
power outages like using different power suppliers and 
associating nodes of the same power supplier to the same 
shared risk group.  
 
B. Social resilience 
Maclean et al. in [6] investigate the social aspects of 
resilience, and identify six attributes for resilience, namely, 
knowledge, skills and learning; community networks;     
people-place connections; community infrastructure; diverse 
and innovative economy; and engaged governance. 
Nevertheless, the authors argue that a distinct knowledge gap 
with regards to resilience’s social aspects, still remains. This 
was the result of exploring social resilience using grounded 
theory, and by identifying the context of resilience in several 
areas, e.g., complex systems, social and health sciences, etc. 
Further recommendations are provided by the authors, which 
are mostly focused on building the six attributes of resilience. 
This may lead, eventually, to strengthening the ability of 
societies, communities and people to adapt, transform, and 
become stronger in the face of various challenges. 
In [7] Mark et al. examine citizens’ response to disasters. 
Specifically, investigations are performed on how people tend 
to use technology, and how people adapt technologies in the 
presence of a critical threat. Such investigations can provide 
information about the systemic changes and implications with 
regard to how technology can support people to be resilient in 
disrupted environments. The approach applied by the authors, 
includes a set of ethnographic studies that helped them in 
identifying properties of resilience within the group of 
interviewees. A major contribution of this work is the 
provision of a better understanding of peoples’ culture in 
relation with technology adoption.  
 
C. Correlated cascading failures 
Disaster disruptions can result in a cascade of failures that 
impact several seemingly independent infrastructures. For 
example, the failure of three power plants in mid-august 2003 
triggered a cascading of power failures affecting 50 million 
people in the US northwest and the province of Ontario in 
Canada [8]. This failure had also a visible impact on the 
interrelated Internet infrastructure, affecting almost half of all 
Internet autonomous systems. Pahwa et al. [9] used 
simulations to analyze the vulnerability of power grids to 
cascading failures. They found that careful post-failure load 
redistribution can help averting cascades. Further, building       
a loosely-coupled grid of islands of different power sources, 
e.g. renewables, can also reduce the risk for cascades. 
Motivated by the large-scale cascading failure that crippled 
the Italian power and Internet infrastructures on September 28,  
2003, Buldyrev et al. [10] studied and modeled the interplay 
between the underlying topologies and vulnerabilities to 
cascades in interdependent networks. Surprisingly, unlike         
a single isolated network a broader degree distribution makes 
interdependent networks more vulnerable to random failures. 
Their findings stressed the importance of taking 
interdependence into account when designing networks.  
Lawler et al. [11] reviewed traditional disaster recovery 
approaches and disaster tolerance techniques in general as 
well as the risk for cascades triggered by IT applications 
downtime. They found that disaster recovery and business 
continuity plans are often laid out after an application has been 
designed and implemented which does not scale given the 
increasing complexity of today’s systems. Instead, they argue 
for the inclusion of an appropriate level of disaster tolerance 
when building systems. Further, this must also include            
a proper understanding of independencies between systems.  
        
D. Proposed solutions 
Several efforts have proposed solutions for maintaining 
connectivity at times of massive failures caused by natural and 
technological disasters. Operating ad-hoc information or 
content centric (ICN or CCN [12]) networks that relay data 
packets based on their contents is viewed as a promising 
approach.   
Oh et al. [13] showed that building a content-centric 
network on top of a large scale mobile ad-hoc network can 
provide a simple content search and delivery systems in 
environment with high mobility and poor performance such as 
in battlefields and emergency situations. Inspired by 
Information Centric Networking (ICN) concepts, [14] 
proposed a name-based communication framework to forward 
messages between nearby nodes in an infrastructure-less 
environment. The proposed approach focuses on replicating 
messages based on their content, instead of blindingly routing 
all messages, to increase the chance of successfully 
transmitting critical messages e.g., between first responders. 
The authors of [15] have proposed a similar solution that 
derives message priorities from node names. Monticelli et al. 
[16] extended this further by leveraging delay tolerant 
networks concepts to deliver data between fragmented ICNs 
such as ambulances and police cars. Each node maintains        
a state that captures the likelihood of encountering nodes that 
belong to different networks. This probability is then used to 
determine whether a node is a suitable data mule.               
Software Defined Networking (SDN) has attracted a great 
deal of attention, because by centralizing the control logic and 
separating it from the data plane, SDN enables high flexibility 
and programmability of the network, as well as vendor-
agnostic equipment, control and management. Therefore, this 
paper focuses on disaster Resilient SND. Section II 
summarizes the measures to characterize network failures and 
the methodology to counter them. Section III gives                
an overview of different techniques towards reliable SDN in 
terms of data and control plane. Section IV focuses on some 
first disaster-specific reliable SDNs, and finally Section V 
concludes the paper. 
II. MEASURES AND METHODOLOGY  
In this section, we provide a survey on experimental works 
that characterize network failures and how, with such 
knowledge, to obtain high-level network design 
methodologies and best practices for network operators. 
 
A. Modelling for quantitative assessment 
A method towards resilience analysis of networked 
systems-of-systems is proposed in [17] by Filippini and Silva, 
i.e., a modeling framework for the resilient analysis of 
networked systems-of-systems based on functional 
dependencies. The originality of that research work is 
concentrated mostly in the modeling and analysis of complex 
and heterogeneous systems. Specifically, important features of 
the framework include the support for functional 
dependencies, and the possibility of performing a sensitivity 
analysis with respect to system variability. Although the 
framework provides a method and analysis based on resilience 
sets, there are still several topics that may require refinements, 
viz. the language used for constructing elements, the model of 
the network response, resilience analysis models, etc. 
B. Measures 
Rare are the works in the communications and networking 
literature characterizing node and/or link failures in 
operational networks in a way that can be exploited by 
researchers to emulate the failures and to design advanced 
network management and design algorithms. 
We focus in the following on three works that, with 
different scopes and levels of detail, try to characterize such 
failures. We describe a recent work characterizing failures 
happening in a regional network provider network in 
Scandinavia [18]. Then we describe another research about 
failures in an inter-continental network centered in North 
America [19], where a particular focus is given to transient 
failures. Moreover, we describe a work on the characterization 
of long-lasting failures, in particular happening after a large 
scale disaster in Japan. 
First, the authors in [18] focus on the time-between-failure 
process, in particular on finding best-fitting well-known 
distributions. They found that the time-between-failures 
process for routers and short distance links can be 
characterized by a Weibull distribution. On the other hand, 
they found that the time-between-failures of long distance 
links is better fit by a gamma distribution. 
The authors in [19] go beyond a characterization based on 
the geographical reach of the links, and also distinguish 
between planned failures and unplanned failures.  For an inter-
continental carrier network, it is shown that 20% of all failures 
are planned failures. The unplanned failures are further 
classified into individual link failures and shared link failures 
(router-related or optical related). Individual link failures 
account for 70% of the unplanned failures. An interesting 
observation is that 55% of all individual link failures are 
caused by 2.5% of the links. These are denoted high failure 
links.  It is also important to report that all high failure links 
are backbone links, while low failure links are mainly access 
links.  Most of high failure links are inter-POP links, and half 
of them share a router with another high failure link. Once 
classified in the two classes of high failure and low failure 
links, two power law regimes were identified. 
Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDFs) of 
the time-between failures for high failure links are given, 
because   a corresponding analytical approximation could not 
be found. It is shown that a subset of the high failure links 
experiences very bursty failures, i.e., most of failures occur 
over a short time period, and at a different extent [19]. On the 
other hand, some other subsets of high failure links exhibit 
failure patterns that persist over the entire time period. 
Therefore, the time-between-failure process presents quite 
heterogeneous cases. 
The empirical CDFs of the time-to-repair for the 
unplanned link failures are also reported, distinguishing 
between high failure links, low failure links and shared (router 
and optical layer) failures. The three distributions significantly 
differ from each other. For example, the ratio of links having  
a time-to-repair less or equal than 25s is roughly 50% for high 
failure links, 30% for low failure links, and only 6% for 
shared failures. All in all, the time-to-repair for high failure 
links is generally much shorter than for the other types of 
unplanned failures.   
With the motivation that failures that last longer and that 
affect a large amount of users are those that should be 
addressed first by any resilient network planning logic, the 
authors in [20] focus on failures lasting more than 2 hours and 
affecting more than 30,000 users. Their major finding is that 
the time-between-failures follows a Poisson distribution, while 
their duration (hence not counting the time-to-repair) follows  
a Pareto distribution. They also analyzed other aspects related 
to the scale of a failure – for instance they report that the 
number of users affected by such serious failures follows        
a piecewise Pareto distribution.  
C. Methodology 
It is widely recognized that the Internet is not sufficiently 
resilient, survivable, and dependable, and that significant 
research, development, and engineering is necessary to 
improve the situation. Resilience must be viewed as an 
essential design and operational characteristic of future 
networks in general, and the Global Internet in particular. 
Sterbenz et al. [8] define network resilience as the ability of    
a network to provide and maintain an acceptable level of 
service in the face of various faults and challenges to normal 
operation. The paper also provides a survey of the disciplines 
that resilience encompasses, along with significant past 
failures of the network infrastructure.  This includes scientific 
disciplines (trustworthiness, with dependability, security, 
performability), and challenge tolerance (with survivability, 
fault-tolerance, traffic tolerance, disruption tolerance).  The 
“ResiliNets” framework in [8] provides a resilience strategy to 
defend against, detect, and remediate challenges, presented as 
a “rule of thumb” set of principles for designing resilient 
networks, as well as related techniques described to analyze 
network resilience. 
The authors in [1], [10] and [21] further investigate 
network resilience, arguing that network resilience 
methodologies and solutions should be taking into account 
dependencies between network components and between 
systems at large to avoid large scale serious failures.  
In [21], it is stressed that today’s infrastructure, e.g. 
transportation, commerce and other economic activity, and 
interaction of all kinds may be regarded as a set of 
interconnected and interdependent networks. The kernel of 
these networks is constituted by the ICT infrastructure. These 
networks of networks are complex and poorly understood and 
their interdependence makes them vulnerable to 
failures/unforeseen events and may cause an unforeseen 
global spread of events with disastrous consequences, i.e., 
they pose a hyper-risk. The paper advocates a paradigm shift 
in thinking: systemic instabilities can be understood by           
a change in perspective from a component-oriented to an 
interaction- and network-oriented view. This calls for              
a fundamental change in the design and management of 
complex dynamical systems. The main contribution in the 
paper is to put this issue authoritatively on the research agenda 
and to make a state of the art overview of the insight we have 
in this problem domain, with respect to drivers and examples 
of systemic instabilities, and available mathematical models to 
get a fundamental understanding of the problem. 
Under a similar view, the authors in [10] study the case 
where two networks are interdependent in such a way that 
failures of a node in one of the networks may result in the 
failure of dependent nodes in the other network, and vice 
versa. This is considered to be important as it may lead to a 
cascade of recursive failures and result in a system 
breakdown. The  blackout that affected much of the Italian 
power grid on  September 28, 2003 is used as a motivating 
and illustrative example: the shutdown of power stations led to 
the failure of nodes in the communication network, which 
again caused loss of control and failure of power stations. [10] 
proposes a methodology for understanding the robustness of 
interacting networks subject to cascading failures. A model of 
such phenomena is introduced and analyzed to obtain its better 
understanding and its dependence of the basic network 
topology and parameters. Analytical solutions are obtained for 
the critical fraction of nodes that, on removal, will lead to a 
failure cascade and to result in a complete fragmentation of 
the two interdependent networks. 
Also, the authors in [1] propose a methodology on the 
resilience analysis of systems-of-systems. A special instance 
in their analysis is that of infrastructures. The analysis of 
infrastructures under disturbance or malfunctioning, as well as 
their ability to resist, react and recover (resilience) is identified 
as one of the most challenging issues in this paper.   
The important features that are identified to be of 
importance in their methodology are:  
(1)  functional dependencies, and  
(2)  the possibility of performing a sensitivity analysis with 
respect to system variability.  
The proposed methodology is claimed to provide along 
with its analysis tool-set a standalone framework for assessing 
the resilience of complex networked systems-of-systems.  
As a common denominator of these works, we can 
therefore summarize that certainly it is important to 
understand individual failures as described in the previous 
subsection, however, the most dangerous failures, such as 
those impacting a large number of users and lasting for long 
time are most likely to trigger a cascade of failure and increase 
the scale of service disruption perceived by end-users. Hence 
methodologies meant to propose countermeasures for serious 
failures should be rooted on the dependability analysis of 
networks in particular and distributed interconnected systems 
in general.   
III. RELIABLE SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS  
The concept of Software Defined Networking (SDN), in 
which the data and control planes are decoupled [22], [23], has 
drawn tremendous attention in recent years, and provides new 
possibilities in traffic engineering and, hence, also in reacting 
to failures. In SDN, the control plane, represented by SDN 
controllers, computes the forwarding rules and installs them in 
the data plane switches, which forward the packets according 
to those rules. 
Doerr and Kuipers [24] have provided a taxonomy of 
Internet failures, which revealed that many failures are outside 
of the scope of existing protection schemes.  
Special attention is being paid to security issues which can 
be mainly classified as: 
(1)  Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which causes 
overloading of controllers by the creation of new and 
unknown flows (in case a switch does not have a rule 
associated to a flow, it forwards it to the controller),  
(2)  conflicting rules,  
(3)  malicious applications,  
(4)  unreliable control-switch communications by taking 
the role of the controller or the attacker, etc.  
All these issues have not been studied in detail yet. 
Let us summarize the state of the art of data and control 
plane reliability related to physical failures (mostly link and/or 
node failures). 
A. Data Plane reliability 
For SDN to be able to deal with the plethora of failures 
that may occur, it itself needs resiliency mechanisms. As 
pointed out by Sharma et al. [25], when a failure occurs, 
obtaining new rules from the controller will take more time 
than the carrier-grade recovery requirement of 50 ms permits. 
Hence, some form of local rerouting needs to be introduced. 
Sharma et al. [25] assume preconfigured primary and 
backup paths for the flows and make use of (path-based) 
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) to detect failures. 
BFD, which can be used over any transport protocol, uses 
control and echo messages between preconfigured end-points 
to detect whether links or paths are up. Sharma et al. also use 
OpenFlow’s fast-failover mechanism (which is part of the 
group table concept present in OpenFlow versions 1.1 and 
later; OpenFlow being a popular SDN protocol to 
communicate between switch and controller) to reroute 
without involvement of the controller. Their approach is tested 
on several networks and shown to achieve failover times 
between 42 and 48 ms.  
Van Adrichem et al. [26] use link-based BFD to realize an 
order of magnitude speed-up in the failover time, compared to 
the path-based approach of Sharma et al. However, both 
Sharma et al. and van Adrichem et al. focus on failure 
detection and failover to preconfigured paths, but they do not 
address the problem of how to find the best alternate paths to 
preconfigure. 
The approach by Tilmans and Vissicchio [27] is somewhat 
different, but does include a mechanism for alternate paths to 
be found (eventually). They propose a hybrid approach in 
which SDN takes care of the overall network configuration, 
but the controller also instructs the “local agents” of the nodes 
to run a link-state IGP protocol (like OSPF or IS-IS). The idea 
is that when a failure occurs, and since asking the controller is 
too time consuming, the IGP protocol will have to adjust to 
the situation and can point to alternate routes. One 
disadvantage of this approach is that IGP convergence may be 
too slow for carrier-grade recovery. The authors mention that 
by adopting IGP with fast reroute mechanisms, fast failover 
should be possible (although no failover times are reported in 
the paper). 
Braun and Menth [28] do use fast reroute in SDN. IP fast 
reroute finds loop-free alternative hops by examining the 
distance estimates (which are computed anyway to populate 
the routing table). Which alternative neighbours to use 
depends on the desired level of protection (e.g., single link 
failure protection or single node failure protection). 
Unfortunately, the stricter the protection level, the fewer 
alternatives may exist. On the other hand, the lower the 
protection level, the more loops may appear, if failures 
manifest that were not part of the protection scheme. To detect 
loops, Braun and Menth propose to encode some failure 
information in the packets. However, since the approach 
remains quite close to IP fast reroute, by relying on shortest 
path distance estimates, the potential of centralized control 
logic is not fully harnessed. 
Van Adrichem et al. [29] therefore argue to enable failure 
recovery in SDN networks by using: 
(1)  fast failure detection through liveliness monitoring 
protocols, as done in [26],  
(2)  failure protection by having the SDN controller 
preconfigure backup rules, which would lead to the 
fastest recovery approach possible, but may lead to      
a temporary non-optimal network configuration, and  
(3)  re-computation of optimal primary and backup rules, 
once the controller is notified of the failure.  
Steps 2 and 3 essentially involve the same computations. 
Van Adrichem et al. [29] provide the algorithms to compute 
those primary and backup rules and which can handle both 
single link and single node failures at only a limited cost in the 
increase of the flow and group tables. 
Cascone et al. [30] have presented SPIDER − a stateful 
mechanism to detect and protect against failures in SDN. 
Their approach is based on OpenState [31], which is an 
extension of OpenFlow to allow switches to apply different 
rules depending on their “state” rather than induced by the 
controller. Failure or packet-level events could then, for 
example, trigger a change in state. The use of states is 
interesting as it, in principle, allows reacting differently to 
different types of failures. However, which actions to best take 
in which states is still a complex question and is not addressed 
in the paper. The authors refer to their prior work [32] to 
indicate that primary and backup paths could be computed. 
However, the technique used in [32] is that of mixed integer 
linear programming, which has an exponential running time 
and may be too costly to execute on large realistic networks. 
Fortunately, SPIDER can operate with any algorithm. For 
example, it could use the algorithms of van Adrichem et al. 
[29], which run in polynomial time, possibly together with 
other algorithms for different types of failures. See [33] for an 
overview of protection algorithms. 
While the work mentioned above may adequately handle 
single failures, it may have to rely on the controller to give 
instructions when large-scale disasters manifest. Moreover, 
the work assumes that the controller platform itself is 
unaffected by the failure. More work is needed for SDNs in 
order to be able to deal with disasters and/or controller 
failures. 
 
B. Control Plane Reliability   
Reliable controller placement is a special subset of 
controller placement problems, which focuses on optimization 
of different reliability aspects of the control plane, such as 
improvement of survivability and fault tolerance and 
minimization of expected control path loss.  
The goal of resilient routing is to find optimal working and 
backup paths between source and destination. Resilient 
anycast routing focuses on finding optimal working and 
backup paths between the source and any of the replicas of the 
destination node [34], which can also be applied to the 
resilient controller placement problem. 
Both aspects complement each other for resilient SDN 
control plane design, hence in the following sections, an 
overview of the related work on reliable controller placement 
and resilient routing is presented.  
The controller placement has a significant impact on the 
reliability and fault tolerance of the SDN control plane. The 
SDN controller is the brain of the network and its failure can 
have an impact on a large number of forwarding devices.   
Hu et al. [35] discuss different reliability measures. 
Deterministic reliability measures focus on connectivity, i.e. 
number of disjoint paths between the nodes and the controller 
or cardinality of minimum cut set. Probabilistic reliability 
measures include the probability of the failure of individual 
physical components to calculate the expected control path 
loss.  
Expected loss of the control path is formulated as a mixed 
integer linear programming (MILP) problem. In [36] Hu et al. 
use several approaches to minimize the expected control path 
loss. Random placement, l-w-greedy and simulated annealing 
algorithms were compared to a brute-force approach. 
Performance is evaluated as the ratio between the best 
solutions found by a given algorithm to the best solutions 
found by brute force. Simulated annealing, 2-1-greedy and     
1-1-greedy show the best performance. 
Another approach proposed by Zhang et al. [37] is based 
on a modified version of min-cut clustering. A cluster is 
defined as a set of nodes controlled by the same controller. 
The algorithm first finds a clustering of the network with the 
smallest number of edges belonging to different clusters (min-
cut) and then it assigns a controller to the node that has 
shortest average distance to all the other nodes in the same 
partition.  
Muller et al. [38] use the node connectivity to find the best 
placement for the controllers. The placement is defined as an 
MILP problem that maximizes the number of node disjoint 
paths between the controllers and the assigned switches. 
Connectivity is pre-calculated for every pair of nodes in the 
network and it is given as an input to a MILP solver. This 
algorithm outperforms the one based on modified min-cut 
clustering defined in [37] in terms of number of disconnected 
network elements for different failure scenarios. 
Network should be resilient against controller failure, 
network component failure, load imbalance and inter-
controller latency. Hock et al. [39] introduced a framework for 
resilient Pareto-based Optimal COntroller placement (POCO), 
which provides all Pareto-optimal controller placements. The 
authors show that more than 20% of the nodes should be 
controller nodes in order to keep alive at least one connection 
between a node and a controller, if an arbitrary double link or 
node fails. Since all mentioned issues and problems are 
opposite proportional, and it is very difficult, or even 
impossible, to find the optimal values, Pareto-optimal 
solutions give an adequate trade-off. 
Adding one or more backup controllers could mitigate the 
risk of compromising the network resilience, but some 
mechanisms for coordination between the primary controller 
and other backup controllers are necessary in order not to lose 
the gathered information and the latest configuration. Fonseca 
et al. [40] present a mechanism that can increase the resilience 
in SDN by using a component organization that handles the 
updates received by the network or other components. Their 
CPRecovery component increases the resilience by handling 
several failure types as it allows an easy transition between the 
failed and the backup controller, which has the latest network 
state. Introducing the component does not require deep 
changes in the SDN protocol, neither produces a significant 
overhead 
In [41] Jimenez et al. define an algorithm named k-Critical 
to minimize the number of controllers necessary to provide 
latency guarantees, while also minimizing the number of hops 
it takes to reach a controller. The logic behind this is that a 
smaller number of hops in a control path has a positive impact 
on its reliability, since there are fewer nodes and switches 
whose failures can interrupt the connection. 
Ros et al. [42] use control plane reliability to find how 
many controllers each node should be connected to in order to 
achieve ”five nines reliability” commonly required in typical 
communication systems. The goal was to provide a required 
degree of reliability with minimum number of controllers. An 
interdependent network approach was used by Guo and 
Bhattacharya in [43] to find the optimal controller placement 
and to study how the cascading of failures affect the control 
plane reliability. 
Resilient controller placement is adding a new dimension 
to resilient anycast routing, because the positions of the server 
replicas (or in our case SDN controllers) are not known in 
advance. Vizarreta et al. [44] provide two resilient controller 
placement models for joint optimization of controller 
placement and resilient control path routing. 
IV. DISASTER-RESILIENT SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS 
This section focuses on the first solutions towards disaster 
resilient SDN networks. Cheng et al. [45] have proposed         
a cross-layer framework to improve the survivability of the 
network suffering from multiple correlated failures. The 
proposed framework relies on GeoDivRIP a novel routing 
protocol that provides resilience through geographically 
diverse paths. An SDN controller running a failure detection 
module analyses the link-layer network statistics, focussing on 
network delay and congestion state to calculate the distance of 
separation between paths. Based on the distance, the 
geodiverse paths for GeoDivRP are calculated, and traffic 
allocation optimizations are performed. The optimized traffic 
allocation, as well as the set of geodiverse paths are passed to 
ResTP, a resilient transport protocol. Furthermore, the 
applications can provide expected threat models to ResTP and 
GeoDivRP to allocate different routes based on expected 
threats. However, this approach relies on the controller 
keeping a complete and up-to-date view of the network 
statistics and link-sate to compute the geodiverse paths which 
might be impractical in large-scale deployments. 
To ensure resilient services in a multi-domain system       
(a “digital ecosystem”), requires flexible and scalable 
solutions for exchange of information between the different 
domains.  Today’s Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) severely 
constrains how networks can deliver traffic over the Internet 
and how to guarantee performance and dependability. Gupta 
et. al. [46] argue that Software Defined Networking (SDN) 
could revolutionize wide-area traffic delivery, by offering 
direct control over packet-processing rules that match on 
multiple header fields and perform a variety of actions. The 
paper describes a Software Defined IXP (called “SDX”), 
which provides:  
(1)  “application-specific peering”,  
(2)  programming abstractions that allow participating 
networks to create and run these applications,  
(3)  correct running when interacting with BGP,  
(4)  ensures that applications do not interfere with each 
other, and  
(5)  system scalabilty (rule-table size and computational 
overhead). 
Sedef Sadav et al. [47] address the resilience aspect of the 
network under man-made attacks, such as electromagnetic 
pulse (EMP) or Weapon of mass destruction (WMD), with     
a particular emphasis on the cascading failures after the main 
event. The authors are proposing to use SDN to address 
today’s inability to respond in a timely fashion to large and 
complex disasters. Differently from early work on SDN-based 
resilient systems relying on a physical centralized control 
plane architecture suffering from scalability, performance and 
reliability problems in large deployments, this paper proposes 
to design a control plane to be disaster-aware by designing it 
as a virtual network and solving it through a virtual-network-
embedding (VNE) approach. The proposed approach decides 
on the number and placement of controllers across the 
network and maps them onto the physical network. To assess 
their approach, the authors use a probabilistic disaster model 
and use it to calculate a vulnerability metric that captures the 
expected connectivity loss of the control-plane due to 
controller node failure, inter-controller communication failure 
and controller-to-switch failure. Finally, they present               
a mathematical formulation for jointly optimizing the virtual 
topology design and VNE such that control-network 
connectivity is ensured after failure.  
Although SDN provides an abstraction and an architecture 
that is flexible and can allow the administrators an easy 
configuration of network devices, still there is a lack of 
support in orchestrating many services that should cooperate 
among each other in order to implement network-wide 
resilience. Future networks will probably consist of more 
closed devices, such as security appliances, which opens         
a challenge: How to use the resilience management in settings 
that include coupled and decoupled deployment models? 
Smith et al. [48] introduced a resilience management 
framework, which can be applied to the problem of 
orchestration of OpenFlow-based services toward network 
resilience implementation. The framework consists of policy-
controlled management patterns, which describe the process of 
orchestration of individual resilience services. These services 
are implemented as OpenFlow applications, possibly over 
several distributed controllers. The resilience mechanisms 
include detection of attacks and anomalies (e.g., IDSs and 
bandwidth monitoring), as well as their remediation. The 
patterns specify how to reconfigure the deployed mechanisms 
in order to address some specific network challenge. 
V. CONCLUSION  
This paper aims at giving an overview of different 
technology-related disasters affecting communication 
networks. Due to the importance of Software Defined 
Networking (SDN), special attention has been devoted to 
present the state of the art on the resilience issues and 
approaches towards resilient SDN networks. However, there 
are still some open issues, such as security and consideration 
of disaster scenarios, which will be studied in the framework 
of the COST RECODIS Action.   
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